Why do governments and the IMF enter into agreements? According the IMF Articles of Agreement, governments should turn to the Fund for a straightforward reason: they need an IMF loan. An alternative argument is that governments want IMF conditions to be imposed to help push through unpopular economic reforms. To illustrate how the desire for IMF conditions can play a role in the decision to enter into an agreement, I study two analytically significant cases. Drawing upon a data set of 4,126 country-year observations, I examine two outliers: the country observed with the least need for an IMF loan participating in an IMF program (Uruguay 1990), and the country with the strongest need for an IMF loan not participating in an IMF program (Tanzania 1983). Both cases indicate that governments enter into agreements because they want IMF conditions to be imposed.
Introduction

Why do governments enter into programs sponsored by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF)? IMF programs are supposed to be imposed by the Fund as a condition for providing a government access to foreign exchange. According to the IMF Articles of Agreement, a country may enter into such a program when it "represents that it has a need to make the purchase because of its balance of payments or its reserve position or developments in its reserves" (Article V, Section 3).
Suppose one could measure the "need" a country has for foreign exchange. One could imagine different types of cases: Cases found in Cells 1 and 4 of Table 1 would support the understanding that governments turn to the Fund when they need a loan. Cases in Cells 2 or 3 would not:
countries that do not need foreign exchange should not participate in IMF agreements, and countries that need foreign exchange should participate.
Drawing upon a data set of 4,126 country-year observations of 135 countries from 1951 (or year of independence) to 1990, I find cases that fit into each of the cells of Table   1 . In particular, there are substantial numbers of observations that fit into Cells 2 and 3.
This is consistent with what other studies have found. As Bird notes in a review of recent empirical research, while foreign reserves influences the demand for IMF arrangements, "neither a current account nor an overall balance of payments deficit provides sufficient motivation for seeking Fund support" (Bird 1996 (Bird , 1755 ).
An alternative argument can explain such cases. According to this view, governments bring in the Fund to help push through unpopular economic reforms (Przeworski and Vreeland forthcoming, Dixit 1996 , Bjork 1995 , Edwards and Santaella 1993 , Stein 1992 , Putnam 1988 , Remmer 1986 , Vaubel 1986 , Spaventa 1983 ).
Governments may enter into IMF agreements not simply because they need an IMF loan, but because they want specific conditions to be imposed. Thus, some governments may sign an agreement even if they do not need a loan (Cell 2). Other governments may not want IMF conditions imposed upon them. They may choose not to sign an IMF agreement even if they need a loan (Cell 3).
In order to explore how the utility of IMF conditions can influence the decision to enter into an IMF agreement, I study two analytically significant cases:
(1) The case observed with the highest level of foreign reserves participating in an IMF program: Uruguay 1990.
(2) The case observed with the lowest level of foreign reserves not participating in an IMF program: Tanzania 1983.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how I chose these cases. In sections 3 and 4, I focus on the two cases of interest: Tanzania and Uruguay. Section 5 points to broader implications of these analytically significant cases.
Statistically selected cases
How should cases be selected? In order to best inform the logic of an argument, cases should be chosen to maximize analytical leverage over a given question. Consider different types of cases that a question identifies. The substantive question of this paper is why governments enter into agreements, and the standard answer is that they need foreign exchange. Thus, the "types" regard this need for foreign exchange facing governments.
Suppose one starts with level of foreign reserves as a first-cut proxy for this need 1 : "Reserves" is foreign reserves measured in terms of monthly imports. "Low" reserves is set at less than 2.4 times monthly imports. This arbitrary cut-off point is the median level of reserves of the 1,664 observations available on the 135 countries considered in this study, and also is the average level of reserves for countries participating in agreements. Source: World Development Indicators. country-years with high and low reserves observed participating or not participating in IMF agreements.
Note that 60 percent of the observations in Table 2 are consistent with the view that governments sign when facing a foreign exchange crisis (those observations along the downward sloping diagonal). In 414 country-years observations, reserves are low and the 1 There are, of course, other measures of a country's need for foreign exchange that the IMF uses, such as the country's balance of payments position, but such measures indicate a flow of exchange. Ultimately what matters to governments is whether they have on reserve enough foreign exchange to continue to purchase necessary imports. Thus, the foreign reserve position, measured in terms of monthly import requirements, is good starting point. I address other economic indicators when exploring the specific cases below. 1980 1972 1982 Botswana 1987 -9 Chad 1974 Colombia 1986 Colombia 1980 -1 Congo 1984 -5, 1989 El Salvador 1988 Iran 1980 Guyana 1989 Ethiopia 1971 Jordan 1971 Senegal 1975 Guatemala 1975 Malta 1968 -84 Sudan 1986 India 1989 Nepal 1974 Tanzania 1983 Jordan 1982 , 1984 Nigeria 1975 Malaysia 1982 , 1990 Portugal 1969 -71, 1976 Myanmar 1989 Trinidad & Tobago Nigeria 1978 1978 -9, 1982 Papua New Guinea Uruguay 1974 1979 -80, 1983 Venezuela 1975 -6, 1986 Paraguay 1990 Somalia 1976 Thailand 1984 Tunisia 1972 Turkey 1975 Lagged reserves for country-years under agreement:
Extremely low Typical Extremely high -0.1 -0.1 2.4 8. 6 -15.2 Benin 1989 Central African Republic Myanmar 1975 Congo 1986 -8, 1990 1980 , 1984 Portugal 1977 , Cote d'Ivoire 1981 -90 Ecuador 1990 1979 , 1983 -4 Gabon 1978 -88 Guatemala 1983 Turkey 1969 -70 Guinea-Bissau 1987 Honduras 1980 Uruguay 1973 , Guyana 1982 Hungary 1984 1975 -84, 1986 -1987 , 1990 Liberia 1981 , 1983 , 1985 -6 South Korea 1977 Madagascar 1980 -1 Mauritania 1977 Panama 1982 -3 Mexico 1984 Senegal 1982 , 1985 -6 Niger 1985 Somalia 1985 Romania 1976 , 1983 Sudan 1982 -5 Turkey 1983 Uganda 1981 Uganda 1984 Uruguay 1990 had the sixth strongest foreign reserve position of all countries to enter into a spell of IMF agreements, and the strongest reserves of any country ever to enter with both the balance of payments and the current account in surplus. On these measures, Uruguay is the most extreme case.
Regarding the other type of interesting case, where countries do not participate in IMF programs despite low reserves, Table 2 indicates there are 413 observations. argue that one can best understand their actions by looking at their stances toward IMF conditionality rather than their need for an IMF loan.
Non-Victims with a program: Uruguay
Uruguay did not need foreign currency when it signed the 1990 agreement. Indeed, of the 136.7 million dollars provided by the fifteen month stand-by arrangement, Uruguay drew down less than 10 percent of the credit provided. This amounted to about one tenth of one percent of gross domestic product (GDP). The overall balance of payments of Uruguay was in surplus in 1989 and 1990 (see Figure 1 ) as was the current account balance (see Figure 2 ). Uruguay also held a strong foreign reserves position. The 1988 reserves were 10.2 times the average monthly import requirements. This level dropped to 7.7 by 1990 but remained strong by developing country standards. The rest of Latin America held reserves of only 3.7 times average monthly import requirements; reserves in Uruguay were more than double this (see Figure 3) . Under the IMF programs of the late 1970s, the budget deficit had been eradicated (see Figure 7) . However, no sooner had the budget gone into surplus than government consumption began to rise. By 1981, government expenditures once again outpaced government revenue. Still under IMF programs, the government brought the deficit down again to less than one percent of GDP in 1986, but it left IMF programs in 1987. After the country left IMF programs, the deficit again began to grow. By 1989, it had reached three percent, the highest deficit since 1984. Thus, the government sought to reduce the size of the public sector -but it faced opposition.
Why did Lacalle need the IMF?
To understand the tenuous political position of the reform-oriented Lacalle, it is useful to review the historical development of the welfare state in Uruguay as well as the political institutions and parties that supported the large role of the state in the economy.
Early in the twentieth century, Uruguay became one of the first welfare states in the world and the first in Latin America (Mesa-Lago 1978 and 1985 , cited in Filgueira and Papadópulos 1997 . Cattle and sheep products drove export-led prosperity from the 1870s to the 1950s. The flourishing economy generated government surpluses which "helped finance the development of protected import substitution industries and the expansion of the state apparatus" (Filgueira and Papadópulos 1997: 369) .
A client-patron system developed where the political parties used the state to redistribute resources their constituencies. Filgueira and Papadópulos (1997:381) define this system as one "of redistribution of political goods sustained by the material and regulatory resources of the state." Thus, both main parties, the Blancos and the Colorados, advocated a strong role for the state in the economy, promoting state owned enterprises, protectionist policies, and generous social benefits.
Large segments of the population came to have a vested interest in maintaining the welfare state due to "high levels of incorporation" (see Filgueira and Papadópulos 1997: 368, 379) . Labor unions, for example, lobbied for high levels of labor protection. And the beneficiaries of the strong state were not isolated to labor. The percentage of public employment was high compared to the rest of Latin America, and coverage from state service was largely based on equal distribution, not concentrated on any particular group. Small left-wing parties began to work together in the early 1960s (Gonzalez 1995: 152) . In 1971, the "Frente Amplio" -a coalition of the parties of the left -was born and took eighteen percent of the national vote (Gonzalez 1995: 152) . In addition to this success at the polls, outright insurrection of the left wing in the late 1960s and early 1970s pressured the government to resist austerity. But with the end of dictatorship, opponents of IMF-style austerity were allowed to organize legally again (Filgueira and Papadópulos 1997: 365) . Labor leaders called general strikes opposing the influence of international organizations in domestic politics. The Frente Amplio reemerged. And thirteen of the most important associations of retirees formed the Plenary of Associations of Retirees and Pensioners of Uruguay (Filgueira and Papadópulos 1997: 365) . Overall, organizations representing retired persons and pensioners constituted about twenty percent of the total population, and an additional ten percent were public servants (Rial 1986: 136) .
In November 1989, in the first fully free election since 1972, the opponents of economic reform did well at the polls. Frente Amplio gained a presence in Congress and its candidate was elected mayor of the capital city, which includes forty-two percent of Uruguay's 3.2 million people. Nevertheless, the reform-oriented Lacalle of the Blanco Party took the presidency.
Upon election, Lacalle announced plans of economic reform "if necessary" (New York Times: 28 November 1989) . He talked of raising taxes and cutting public spending.
He wanted to privatize national industries, reform the state pension system, and reduce the size of the state.
But Lacalle had hardly received a mandate. His party received only thirty-seven percent of the presidential vote (Schooley 1997) , and Lacalle himself received only twenty-two percent (Financial Times: 8 November 1994) . 5 The Colorados received thirty percent of the presidential vote, and Frente Amplio received twenty-one percent. The main opposition party received nearly as many votes as Lacalle himself, and overall, seventyeight percent of the electorate had not voted for Lacalle.
In Congressional elections, the Blanco Party only won forty percent of the seats (Schooley 1997 (Gonzalez 1995: 161) .
There were three further reasons that the newly elected president needed an international ally to get past domestic opposition: (1) institutional factors leading to a lack of party discipline, (2) the patron-client promotion system that failed to reward technocrats, and (3) the institution of the national referendum.
(1) Lack of party discipline: Lacalle could not depend upon the loyalty of his governing coalition. Gonzalez (1995: 147) explains that the electoral voting system of "double simultaneous vote" weakened party discipline because the system allowed for intraparty preferences at the voting booth. Primaries and elections were held simultaneously such that the party with the most votes won the election, and the candidate with the most votes from that party took office. Thus, Gonzalez argues, "Candidates cannot rely solely on their party; they must distinguish themselves from competitors within their own party. They must develop at least a minimal organizational base of their own" (Gonzalez 1995: 147) .
(2) Patron-client promotion: Furthermore, Lacalle could not look to national technocrats for support because there were so few of them in positions of power.
Promotion within political parties was based not on merit or training, but on patron-client relationships (Filgueira and Papadópulos 1997: 380) . Thus, unlike other developing countries, Western trained economists (i.e., IMF-style economists) had not been promoted to the upper echelons of the parties.
(3) National referendum: Lacalle was also up against an additional institution that could work against his reform efforts: the national referendum (Filgueira and Papadópulos 1997, Lupia and McCubbins 1998) . Opponents could petition to have legislation put to a national plebiscite that could override any reforms pushed through Congress. Some of Lacalle's measures were not successful. He won the approval of Congress for the controversial privatization of the last state-owned telephone company. Yet, this measure was so unpopular that after it was passed, opponents gathered the signatures necessary to hold a national referendum on the legislation. When put to the national electorate, the motion to repeal the privatization legislation carried with a seventy percent majority of the electorate.
This referendum highlights just how unpopular Lacalle's policies were and shows why he wanted IMF conditionality to be imposed. Lacalle needed allies. The fact that he won the approval of Congress for a measure opposed by more than seventy percent of the voters indicates that the IMF alliance may have helped. The increased leverage from the IMF may not have been enough to push through policies when put "directly to citizens on the basis of specific policy preferences" (Filgueira and Papadópulos 1997: 380) , but it was enough to get it past substantial opposition in Congress.
This was, nevertheless, a major defeat for Lacalle's reform program. The For this agreement, however, the case can be made that there was a prospective need for the IMF loan. 8 The IMF explained that the program would hurt the current account surplus because it called for opening the economy to imports (IMF Survey 1992:
238-9). By 1992 export duties were cut by more than half of what they were in 1990 and import duties were also reduced. Recall, however, that this was not the reason for the first IMF loan. Indeed, under the 1990 agreement, import duties were increased five percent.
Beyond the opening of the economy, the Fund reported frankly that the goal of the 1992 program was to "consolidate gains made in the fiscal area" (IMF Survey 1992: 238-9). And despite the lack of domestic support, Lacalle implemented much of the reform program. In addition to what had already been forced through, the President succeeded in ending the state monopoly on insurance and pushed through port reform, as well as re-privatizing all four banks absorbed by the previous administration and selling the last stateowned meat packing plant (Financial Times: 25 May 1994) . Lacalle lost the big battle over social security 9 and the sale of the telephone company, but he won many other unlikely victories.
By the end of his term, Lacalle gained the approval of investors and creditors. In
May 1994, the Economist Intelligence Unit improved the political risk rating of Uruguay.
The change was issued because of "continued efforts at structural reform by the Lacalle administration -and its partial success -despite a hostile congress." (The Economist
Intelligence Unit cited in Financial Times: 25 May 1994).
In particular, foreign direct investment experienced a dramatic increase going from zero in 1991 to less than 0.01 percent of GDP in 1992 to 0.74 percent of GDP in 1993 and nearly one percent of GDP in 1994. Overall investment grew every year after 1990, going from twelve percent of GDP in 1991 to thirteen percent in 1992 to over fourteen percent in 1993 and 1994. Economic growth (percent of GDP) went from less than one percent in 1990 to three percent in 1991 and nearly eight percent in 1992. Growth slowed to about two and a half percent in 1993 but then shot back up to over six and a half percent in 1994.
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As for the causal link between the IMF agreement and the economic improvements, the relevant counterfactual to consider for my argument is not whether these changes would have occurred had no agreement been signed. Rather, consider the following counterfactual: Given that an agreement was signed by the Lacalle administration, had the IMF program been rejected in its entirety, these improvements would not have come to 9 Social security reform was given up by this administration after four attempts to push it through Congress achieved only minor changes in the system (Financial Times: 25 May 1994). 10 These figures come from World Development Indicators 1997.
fruition. The IMF would not have issued the 1992 press release declaring the 1990 program a success, and a negative signal would have been sent to creditors and investors.
Investment and growth would have suffered from a rejected IMF program.
Victims without a program: Tanzania
The case of Uruguay is clear: the government did not need an IMF loan, it signed because it wanted IMF conditions to be imposed. Other cases where governments enter into IMF agreements, however, are more ambiguous. When governments suffer from shortfalls of foreign exchange, they need an IMF loan. They may also want conditions to be imposed, but evidence may be less obvious.
In this section, I seek to establish that governments derive some minimum utility from IMF conditionality. Governments that sign with the IMF may or may not desire conditions to the same extent as the Lacalle administration, but at least they derive more utility from conditions than did the government of Tanzania in 1983.
The case of Tanzania is the starkest example of a government that has a strong need for an IMF loan but does not sign an IMF agreement. Such a case is a clear illustration of a government that decides not to sign an IMF agreement because it does not want conditions to be imposed.
Consider What is strange about the case of Tanzania is that reserves continued to drop reaching an all time low in 1982, and yet the government allowed its three year agreement with the IMF to expire without signing another agreement in 1983. Reserves remained extremely 23 low in 1983, 1984, and 1985 , and the country ran a balance of payments deficit straight through this period. The government did not return to the Fund, however, until 1986. 
The 1975 Agreement
According to Campbell and Stein (1992:1) , "The IMF and the World Bank's stated goal of economic liberalization was publicly resisted in Tanzania until 1986."
Independence leader and President Julius Nyerere based his rule on advocating a particular form of Tanzanian socialism that stressed independence from world powers. His famous Arusha Declaration, issued in 1967, called for egalitarianism, socialism, and self-reliance.
The government was accordingly reluctant to enter into IMF agreements.
When the government needed foreign exchange in the early 1970s, it avoided IMF conditions for as long as possible by taking out loans from the IMF that did not entail conditionality.
First, the government drew down the maximum amount of foreign exchange allowed without entering into a special arrangement. All IMF member governments keep a specified amount of their national currency -called the country's quota -on deposit at the Fund. A certain proportion of a member's quota can be drawn down in terms of foreign exchange with no questions asked. The general view of the Fund is that the ebbs and flows of reserves due to trading-as-usual may lead to small balance of payments deficits, causing a government to draw on no more than twenty-five percent of its quota (Stiles 1990, 2) .
Thus, a member can freely draw on other countries' currency up to an amount equivalent to twenty-five percent of its quota. If a government needs to draw on more than this amount, the Fund assumes that the balance of payments deficit must be due to bad policy.
So the IMF usually calls for policy changes as a condition of the loan of foreign exchange.
When Tanzanian reserves plummeted in 1974, the government drew down 10.5 million SDR 11 from the Fund -exactly twenty-five percent of its quota (IMF Survey 1974: 86) . This was the limit of what the government could take without signing an agreement.
When the government faced further need of foreign exchange, it negotiated an agreement from the Oil Fund Facility of the IMF for 6.3 million SDR. The Oil Facility was a special facility designed to provide foreign exchange to countries facing shortages due to the impact of increased petroleum prices (IMF Survey 1974: 86) . Because rising oil prices were viewed as a random shock and not the result of bad policy, these agreements entailed no conditions. Thus, the Tanzanian government was able to obtain foreign exchange through this agreement without having the Fund impose conditions. The government made a second Oil Facility purchase for 3.15 million SDR in 1975 (IMF Survey 1975 . In total up to this point, Tanzania had obtained nearly 20 million SDR in loans from the IMF without submitting to conditionality.
Economic problems persisted, however, and Tanzania finally entered into a one year stand-by arrangement for 10.5 million SDR in August 1975. The IMF press release stated that the program was "in support of the government's economic and financial policies of expanding output and tightening fiscal and monetary measures" (IMF Survey 1975: 254) . Stein (1992: 63) reports, however, that the actual conditions associated with the arrangement were weak. The IMF required only that domestic credit usage by the public sector be constrained. The government did not want any conditions imposed, but it 11 SDR stands for "Special Drawing Right." This is a pseudo-currency used as a common denomination for the foreign exchange held on deposit at the Fund. So that its will remain more stable than any single currency, it is valued on the basis of a basket of five currencies: the German marc, the French franc, the Japanese yen, the British pound, and the US dollar. It is currently valued at $1.33.
desperately needed foreign exchange. The IMF granted an agreement with soft conditions, and the government accepted.
The 1980 Agreement
Four years later, foreign reserves plummeted again because of the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda. Thus, the government returned to the Fund for assistance in 1979.
This time, however, the Fund offered a severe package that the government refused And the government succeeded in getting extremely soft conditions.
According to the three year arrangement, Tanzania would receive access to 179.6 million SDR, equivalent to 327 percent of Tanzania's quota (IMF Survey 1980: 328) . In return, the government had to do very little. It got around devaluating the national currency by agreeing to "a joint Tanzanian-IMF study of the exchange rate" (New York Times: 4
September 1980). The other previously demanded conditions regarding foreign exchange and price controls were abandoned.
It turned out that the only actual demand that the Fund made was that a ceiling be placed on government borrowing. Even this single condition was too much for the government. The program fell apart by November 1980 after the government exceeded the limit on public borrowing and the IMF suspended disbursement of loans (Stein 1992: 64) .
At this point, Tanzania had only drawn upon 25 million SDR of the 179.6 million SDR set aside by the 1980 agreement. In order to regain access to the foreign exchange remaining under the arrangement, the Fund demanded that Tanzania meet a new list of conditions: a currency devaluation of 50 to 60 percent, reductions in the government budget deficit, a freeze on wage increases, "commercially sound" parastatal policies (removing subsidies on gas and petroleum products), increased interest rates, increased producer prices, and the removal of import controls (Stein 1992: 65) . Tanzania rejected these conditions and allowed the agreement to expire in 1982 without entering a new IMF program.
Thus, Tanzania did not participate in an IMF program in 1983 despite shortages in reserves because the IMF demanded more conditions than the government was willing to accept.
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Note that rejecting the IMF was costly. Figure 9 shows that once it became clear Tanzania would not renegotiate a new program, investment dropped from 11.8 percent of GDP to 8.9 percent, the lowest level since 1964 (see Penn World Tables 5.6 ). The government preferred this alternative to complying with IMF conditions. Indeed, originally intended to provide exchange rate stability, the IMF faced a crisis of purpose when the United States went off the gold standard in 1973. It was during this period that the Fund changed its focus from monitoring exchange rates to "providing
[members] with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments" (de Vries 1986, 14) . Fulfilling this latter function, the IMF gradually changed its major operations from regulating currency to managing balance of payments difficulties, becoming deeply involved in the national policies of much of the third world. During this period the negotiation posture of the IMF was weak, and it was willing to grant soft conditions to the government of Tanzania. Essentially, the Fund needed business.
In the late 1970s, the Fund gradually changed its major operations from regulating currency to more strictly managing balance of payments difficulties. The organization became more deeply involved than ever before in the national policies of much of the third Furthermore, after the 1982 world debt crisis, the Fund was under more scrutiny than ever before. Critics of the Fund began to argue that the stabilization programs sponsored by the IMF did not go far enough -deeper, structural adjustment was needed.
Thus, not only was the budget tighter, the technocratic position of the IMF also became more severe.
When Tanzania failed to live up to the lenient conditions granted in the original 1980 agreement, the Fund insisted on stricter conditions than Tanzania had ever faced. The government considered these conditions too severe and bailed out of the agreement.
Changing views of reform
When the 1980 IMF program fell apart, Nyerere undertook his own economic program called the National Economic Survival Program (NESP). The NESP, however, relied on mere directives to state entities and on moral exhortation to peasants and workers (Kiondo 1992: 23-4 by 12 percent in March, and then by 20 percent in July (Kiondo 1992: 24) . By 1984, the government removed subsidies, raised producer prices, introduced new taxes to finance the budget deficit, froze certain civil service hiring, and devalued an additional 26 percent (Stein 1992: 68-9) .
Another important area of reform involved trade liberalization. The government allowed people to import goods with their own foreign exchange and sell these imports domestically. This represented an important area for compromise between the IMF and the government since it effectively opened a second window allowing the Tanzanian currency to operate on a dual exchange rate (Kiondo 1992: 26) . Hence, this reform really represented a further devaluation.
Other reforms were envisaged: adjusting marketing and produce prices, cutting back government expenditures, reducing monetary expansion, and improving the efficiency of the state sector. Yet, unable to garner enough support from the members of the ruling (and only) political party -the Chama Cha Mapinduzi revolutionary party (CCM) -supporters could not push these reforms through (Kiondo 1992: 24 (Matthews 1998 (Matthews : 1036 .
Facing such resistance, Mwinyi was unable to bring about his reforms. Indeed, as Kiondo (1992) argues that the Fund was brought in as an ally for those supporting economic reform to use against the elements in CCM that opposed Mwinyi's economic program. Over time, "The owners of [foreign exchange] …gained supporters in the party and the government while forging an alliance with the IMF and the World Bank." (Kiondo 1992: 26) . Therefore, by the time of the IMF agreement [in 1986 ] there were elements in Tanzanian society with an objective interest in the reforms. However, because they did not yet dominate the state there was subterfuge in the approach taken by Tanzania in implementing the reforms. Indeed, Tanzania's reforms are implemented in secretive, unplanned, and nondemocratic ways (Kiondo 1992: 35) .
Kiondo goes on to argue that "the IMF found domestic allies who in turn found supporters within the state" (Kiondo 1992: 35) .
How could an alliance with the IMF help push through the reforms? On the one hand, the government could still argue that the country needed foreign reserves. The need, in fact, was desperate (recall Figure 8) . Furthermore, the IMF agreement increased the pressure to reform, since a failure to do so would no longer be a mere rejection of Mwinyi, Thus, even though Tanzania in fact needed an IMF loan, the same logic that applied to Lacalle's move to bring in the IMF applies here as well. Indeed, when the country needed an IMF loan but did not want IMF conditions (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) , the government rejected Fund agreements. When the government of Tanzania finally returned to the IMF, it did so not only because it wanted foreign exchange but because it wanted conditions. The government sought political support through IMF conditionality to push through its preferred policies.
Why did Tanzania not turn to the Fund in 1983? Tanzania did not sign in 1983 because it did not get the conditions it wanted. Regarding the 1975 and 1980 agreements, the government signed reluctantly and only after negotiating for conditions close to its ideal point (which was effectively zero conditions). When the government finally signed another IMF agreement in 1986, it did so because its preferences over conditions had changed. The new government gained greater utility from the increased conditions demanded by the Fund.
Implications
The cases presented here are clear-cut:
-The government of Uruguay in 1990 did not need an IMF loan. It signed an IMF agreement because it wanted conditions imposed.
-The government of Tanzania in 1983 needed an IMF loan. It did not sign an IMF agreement because it did not want conditions imposed.
Conventional wisdom holds that the IMF uses conditionality to force governments to accept painful austerity measures. Otherwise, governments would reform on their own.
As Fischer puts it, "Policy conditionality can be interpreted as a...penalty, as seen from the viewpoint of the borrower country's policy makers" (Fischer 1999 , also see Bird 1995: 94-6 By entering into IMF agreements, these governments tied their preferred policies of economic reform to the conditions imposed by the IMF. For opponents of economic reform, this move raised the costs of rejecting the government's proposals, because a rejection was no longer a mere rejection of the president but also of the IMF. A total rejection of the IMF would have sent out costly negative signals to creditors and investors.
Thus, the governments were able to push through more of their reform programs than they would have without the IMF. This argument is similar to Schelling's (1960: 22) contention that "the power to constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind oneself." Note here, however, that everyone is constrained: the reformers as well as their opponents. The entire country suffers if the IMF is rejected and the Fund signals disapproval.
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Can one draw broader lessons from these cases? What can these cases tell us about the bulk of observations from Ostensibly, these governments may enter into IMF agreements simply for the IMF loan. But they might also want conditions to be imposed. A priori, one cannot say. After studying the cases presented here, however, one can conclude the following: The governments at least do not disdain the specific conditions imposed to the same extent as While only statistical tests can establish typical patterns about the population, one gets a broad picture of the level of utility derived from IMF conditions from the cases presented here because they were selected according to specific analytical criteria:
The case of Tanzania 1983 sets a minimum bound on the utility derived from IMF conditions, and the case of Uruguay 1990 indicates a range. The governments of countries from Cell 1 derive more utility from the specific conditions imposed by their IMF agreements than the government with the strongest need for an IMF loan with no IMF agreement (Tanzania), and they may want a high level of conditionality to be imposed, as the case of an agreement with no need for a loan illustrates (Uruguay).
This conclusion has broad implications about how one thinks about IMF agreements and conditionality. The Fund plays the role of an international lender of last resort, providing countries with foreign exchange during financial crises. Because shortfalls in foreign reserves may arise from bad policy, the existence of a lender of last resort introduces moral hazard (Bird 1995 and Fischer 1999) . Access to an IMF loan lowers the incentive for governments to pursue sound policy. The loan simply ends up subsidizing the balance of payments deficit. Conditionality is thought of as the penalty necessary to curb moral hazard (Bird 1995 and Fischer 1999 ).
This study shows that conditionality may not be viewed as a penalty by governments. For the governments presented here, conditionality was not a penalty imposed for following bad policies, but a mechanism needed by the governments to change policy. They did not change policies to avoid conditions, rather they needed conditions to change policy. But if governments can most effectively use IMF conditionality in times of crisis, when the stakes of rejecting the IMF are high, then conditions may be too little too late. Recently, the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission, established by the US Congress, released its report on the future role of the IMF (the Meltzer Report). It suggests that conditionality be abandoned in favor of new mechanisms to address moral hazard. The evidence in this paper supports the view that we need to rethink the role of conditionality.
